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Abstract
The priority inversion problem arises when prioritized processes concurrently attempt to enter crit-
ical sections. This phenomenon results in extremely pessimistic estimations of worst case response
times for real-time processes. Various protocols against priority inversion have been proposed in
the literature and are available at system call level of operating systems and run-time executives.
They belong to two major families of protocols: the priority inheritance protocols (PIP) and to the
priority ceiling protocols (PCP). These protocols have in common that they allow to derive more
optimistic worst case response times.
In contrast to the importance of this predictability aspect in the context of time-critical appli-
cations a lot of PIP- and PCP-implementations are not correct and permit the violation of time
bounds. This article presents an eﬀective and ﬂexible tool set applied here for the validation of the
implementations of protocols of the PCP-family. Besides the manual setup and instrumentation
major parts of the black-box validation process are executed automatically.
Keywords: priority ceiling protocols, time-critical applications, real-time operating systems,
semi-automated protocol validation
1 Introduction
A large number of operating systems and run-time executives are contending
for the market of real-time and/or embedded applications. In this context
the major strategy of advertisement is to demonstrate the completeness in
fulﬁlling the essential real-time features. One of these is the availability of one
or more protocols against the phenomenon of priority inversion.
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From the application programmer’s viewpoint there exists a strong pref-
erence for operating systems and run-time executives implementing a deﬁned
priority inheritance protocol or priority ceiling protocol. These permit the ap-
plication of well established disciplines of engineering to achieve predictability
for a given real-time system. The necessary parameters to do this consist of:
• the worst case execution times of processes
• the durations of execution sequences inside critical sections
• the basic priorities of the processes
• (for the PCP only) the preliminary knowledge about critical sections po-
tentially used by certain processes
Based on this input the worst case response times of processes can be
derived which are necessary to verify the feasibility of the schedule (see [4],
[6], [11] and [18]).
However, this engineering approach suﬀers from two major drawbacks. The
ﬁrst results from the informal description of the protocols in the original article
[10]. Though the protocols are proved correct an immediate implementation
would allow priority inversion [7] and also violate basic theorems [19]. At this
point it is necessary to declare that the intent of our paper is not to call the
merits of the inventors [10] of the PIP and PCP into question. Instead, it
should be noticed that the problem referenced here is a general one: there
exists an informally speciﬁed protocol, a formal model of the execution of
real-time processes, a proof which is correct but a protocol which is not. This
obvious contradiction is solved by the perception – which is not so obvious –
that in reality not the protocol is proved correct but some other formal model.
The second drawback for the engineering approach results from the fact
that the implementations are unreliable. In the majority of cases the preten-
tious advertisement with the availability of PIP- or PCP-protocols manifests in
oversimpliﬁed excerpts, strange protocol interfaces and various forms of errors
and defects. Several examples are given in [9], e.g. contradicting to the an-
nouncement the real-time operating system iRMX [16] implements a deferring
mechanism for the disinheritance of accumulated priorities. So, the protocols
once introduced to gain predictability turn out to be sources of uncertainty in
the hands of the vendors of operating systems. In certain cases slight modi-
ﬁcations of the feasibility calculation permit to even out these deﬁcits (as it
is with iRMX mentioned above), whereas in other cases the implementation
faults are irreparable causing unexpected violations of time bounds. The fol-
lowing table underlines that the majority of operating systems and also several
run-time systems provide an API for the avoidance of priority inversion:
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PIP-family PCP-family —
operating Virtuoso uC/OS II OSE
systems iRMX RTLinux pSOS
LynxOS OSEK/VDX RTAI
Solaris Solaris ...
: : :
run-time : Ada 95 :
systems On Time RTOS32 Real-Time Java RTOS-UH Pearl
The tool set presented in the sequel is a contribution to regain some degree
of certainty, whether an operating system oﬀers predictable PIP- or PCP-
protocols or not. The roots of our approach are not new. There is a variety
of papers intending to verify the protocol in its own description, that is to say
not applicable to external implementations (see e.g. [8] or [5]). In contrast, our
approach goes further in several ways. First, in that the formal description is
usable for several purposes: as a formal basis of a proof system, as unequivocal
instruction for implementation and as input for a tool set to validate protocol
implementations (see ﬁgure 1). Second, the same formal description serves as
an operational speciﬁcation for the protocol. This property can be used for
the assertion of invariant protocol properties which are dynamically testable,
thereby establishing certiﬁable criteria and avoiding the diﬀusion of informal
implementation proposals, e.g. as given in [3]. Furthermore, the tool set
consists of a system of components interacting via well deﬁned data interfaces
which allow to validate process interaction in a very general fashion and, hence,
not only applicable to the PIP- and PCP-protocols.
formal
descriptionverification
implementation
validation
Fig. 1. The formal description as a basis for veriﬁcation, implementation and validation
The paper has its emphasis on the formal protocol description, the compo-
nents of the tool set operating on this description and the validation of protocol
implementations, here exemplary explained with the PCP. Section 2 presents
the formal description which has a substantial orientation towards a modular
tool set for validation purposes. Additionally in section 2 it is mentioned how
the formal description is used for protocol veriﬁcation. Coarsely the process
to validate protocol implementations is subdivided into two major steps, the
generation of an execution space for parallel processes mapping to test suites
in section 3 and the execution of instrumented real-time processes and their
evaluation in section 4. The ﬁnal section 5 assesses the results achieved so far
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and argues that this approach may be applied beyond the range of protocols
against priority inversion.
2 Interchangeable protocol format
The design of the formal description of protocols is a compromise between
the versatility of the notation and the integration into various operative pro-
cesses. The major operative process in our context is the test on conformance
for certain operating systems. So, here the compromise consists of protocol
speciﬁcations based on UML and the Z-speciﬁcation notation [2], expressed in
interchangeable XML-formats. More precisely from UML the class diagrams
and the statecharts are used here. The meta-language which is behind their
graphical representations is coded into document type deﬁnitions (DTD’s)
such that both class diagrams and statecharts are represented in XML. The
architectural concept behind is borrowed from a proposal for the description
of safety-critical systems [17] which is build upon three views: a structural, a
reactive and a functional view.
In this context class diagrams represent the structural view. For the speci-
ﬁcation of protocols class diagrams describe the sets of relevant objects as well
as their relations. Particularly for the protocols against priority inversion the
relevant objects are the processes contending for critical sections which are
administrated by a single scheduler (see ﬁgure 2). Any class diagram has a
unique XML-representation for its attributes, methods and relations, e.g. for
the scheduler’s method sigEnterCS which is called when a process p tries to
enter critical section c 2 :
:
<class name="Scheduler">
:
<operation name="sigEnterCS"
rtype=""
rname=""
observable="TRUE"
<parameter name="p" type="Process" />
<parameter name="c" type="CriticalSection" />
</operation>
:
</class>
:
The reactive aspect of the protocol is speciﬁed by statecharts. Interaction
in the case of these protocols happens between the active objects which are
the processes and the scheduler. Based on a DTD statecharts are described in
a unique notation, representing their nested structure, the states and the tran-
sitions from one state to another. E.g. for the method sigEnterCS from the
2 The method sigEnterCS serves as an ongoing example throughout the paper.
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P
*
1
Scheduler
<<singelton>>
+sigReady (p: Process)
+sigEnterCS (p: Process; c: CriticalSection) 
+sigLeaveCS (p: Process; c: CriticalSection)
+sigComplete (p: Process)
next (): Process
getRunning (): Process
leaveCS (p: Process; c: CriticalSection)
wantsCS (p: Process; c: CriticalSection)
enterCS (p: Process)
blockProcess (p: Process; cc: CriticalSection)
wakeUpSet (p: Process): \fset Process
ceilingOk (p: Process, cc: CriticalSection): bool
hasPendingCS (p: Process)
SysCeiling(p: Process): CriticalSection
CriticalSection
ceiling: int
Process
+priority: int
+actualPriority: int
+sigPreempt ()
+sigRun ()
+sigBlock ()
+sigUnblock ()
+mayEnterCS (CriticalSection c): bool
+mayLeaveCS (CriticalSection c): bool
+notHoldingAnyCS (): bool
uses
*
0..1
*
ownedBy
1..n
wants
0..1
*
blocks
*
0..1
CS *
1
Fig. 2. Classes and associations
class diagram above there exists a corresponding transition in the statechart
of the scheduler.
<statemachine name="Scheduler">
:
<transition name="T12"
source="idle"
target="wantsCS"
<parameter name="p" type="Process" />
<callevent call=sigEnterCS(p,c) />
</transition>
:
</statemachine>
With respect to transitions it has to be distinguished between receive
events of the general form ["["guard"]" ] op"("param")" and send events
of the form ["["guard"]" ] "/" [ [target"." ] op"("param")" ]. The
triggering of sequences of events happens when running processes enter or
leave critical sections or run to completion. For instance the triggering event
described by (see also ﬁgure 3)
[self.mayEnterCS(j)] / sched.sigEnterCS(self,j)
is guarded to verify, whether the process instance p is allowed to acquire
the critical section j. If this is true the process sends a message to the in-
stance sched of the scheduler class which has a corresponding receive event
sigEnterCS in the statechart for the scheduler (ﬁgure 4). The sequence of
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events terminates when a possibly new process continues execution in the
status of running process.
sigPreempt ()
sigRun ()
sigReady () [self.notHoldingAnyCS ()]
/sched.sigComplete (self)
sigBlock ()
sigUnblock ()
sleeping
running [self.notHoldingAnyCS ()]
/sched.sigComplete (self)
readyblocked
Process
[self.mayEnterCS ( j)] / sched.sigEnterCS (self, j)
[self.mayLeaveCS ( j)] / sched.sigLeaveCS (self, j)
[self=pidle]
[else]
 1  2 
 3 
 4 
 5 
 6 
 7 
 8 
 9 
 10 
 11 
Fig. 3. Statechart for the processes
Another triggering event is real-time in a time triggered environment.
This is modelled by the scheduler’s transition T10 attributed by the guard
[isSleeping(p)] which may be ﬁred as long as there are processes not set
ready, yet.
Up to this point the class diagrams and statecharts specify the syntax of
interactions between the processes and the scheduler. The semantics, particu-
larly the prevention of forbidden interleavings, has to be expressed by a third
means, here denoted by Z-speciﬁcations. Z was chosen for two major reasons,
ﬁrst the ease to specify the semantic behavior of the protocols in a mathe-
matical fashion which also can be used for formal proofs. The second reason
comes from the fact that there are several interpreters available to execute
Z-speciﬁed protocols. So, a Z-interpreter is a valuable tool for the validation
of protocol implementations.
Conforming to the structural and reactive models the Z-speciﬁcation intro-
duces the functional basis, here denoted PCPSystem for the PCP. The whole
description is called schema and is subdivided in a syntactical part, deﬁning
the sorts and the kinds of mappings between them. For instance here is indi-
cated that P is a ﬁnite set of processes and that priority is a mapping giving
any process a unique priority. The following part is of semantic nature deﬁn-
ing relations between values, for instance that the actual priority of a process
is greater or equal to its basic priority:
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Scheduler
active
sigEnterCS (p, c)
wantsCS (p, c)
[else]
sigLeaveCS (p, c)
/h.sigUnblock ()
n = next ()
/n.sigRun ()
sigComplete (p)
[isSleeping (p)] 
/ p.sigReady ()
/p.sigBlock ()
/r.sigPreempt ()
r = get-
       Running ()
[ceilingOk (p)]
[hasPendingCS (n)]
h = leave-
    CS (p, c)
delayed-
    EnterCS (n)
[else]
idle
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10 11
12 13
14
15
16
Fig. 4. Statechart for the scheduler
PCPSystem
P : FProcess
CS : FCriticalSection
priority : Process  N
actualPriority : Process → N
ceiling : CriticalSection → N
ownedBy : CriticalSection → Process
wants : Process → CriticalSection
uses : Process ↔ CriticalSection
:
:
∀ p : P • actualPriority(p) ≥ priority(p)
ceiling = {c : CS • c →
max ({p : dom(uses  {c}) • priority(p)})}
:
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The PCP is highly reactive whereas the schema PCPSystem represents its
static behavior only. So, it is necessary to deﬁne its dynamic behavior which
corresponds to the transitions between states as depicted in the statecharts
for the scheduler and the processes. Any transition, any guard and any state
blob may modify the state space of PCPSystem and henceforth is represented
by a dedicated Z-schema:
• Each transition of any statechart has a corresponding Z-schema, to denote
the change of the state of a process or the state of the scheduler. For example
by sending the sigEnterCS-message a process changes from the running-
state to the ready-state. The respective Z-schema is TRProcessT10:
TRProcessT10
∆PCPSystem
p? : Process
P = P ′
p? ∈ P
CS = CS ′
priority = priority ′
stateProcess = stateProcess ′
ownedby = ownedby ′
wants = wants ′
uses = uses ′
stateProcess(p?) = running
stateProcess ′ = stateProcess ⊕ {p? → ready}
The notation ∆PCPSystem indicates the transition of the actual state
PCPSystem to the new state PCPSystem ′. The decisive change by T10 is
reﬂected by the last two lines of the schema where in relation stateProcess
the argument process p? switches from the running to the ready state.
• Each guard has to be represented as a Z-schema returning a boolean value.
For example the guard self.notHoldingAnyCS() has to be true when a
process runs to completion.
notHoldingAnyCS
ΞPCPSystem
p? : Process
p? ∈ P
p? = pidle
ownedBy  {p?} = {}
D. Zöbel et al. / Electronic Notes in Theoretical Computer Science 133 (2005) 315–332322
The notation ΞPCPSystem indicates that the state remains unchanged.
The value true is returned if process p? is outside of any critical section.
• Each state of any statechart potentially changes the overall system status.
Particularly, this is true for the scheduler which is in charge to enforce the
protocol semantics. As an example the next-schema has to determine and
output which process n! runs next:
next
ΞPCPSystem
n! : Process
stateProcess  {running} = {}
n! ∈ P
stateProcess(n!) = ready
actualPriority(n!) = max({q : P | stateProcess(q) = ready •
actualPriority(q)})
Clearly n! is output to be the ready process with maximal actual priority.
• For technical reasons it is necessary that the free parameters of operations
are instantiated, here with candidate processes or candidate critical sec-
tions. Corresponding Z-schemata are named according to the convention
GENClassTransaction and invoked. The transaction name there leads to
a certain method, whose parameters are indicated in the class diagram. A
call to the GEN-schema is answered by the sequence of instantiating param-
eters. For example the call for GENSchedulerT10 is invoked to determine
the candidate processes which may become ready:
GENSchedulerT10
p? : Process
p! : Process
isSleeping [p!/p?]
Furthermore the characterizing invariant for the particular protocol should
be expressed. This invariant simpliﬁes the protocol veriﬁcation, helps to detect
errors in the formal description and monitors the validation process. In the
case of the PCP a major predicate of the invariant states: When process p1
owns a critical section (relation ownedBy) , processes p1 and p2 both might
use critical section c2 (relation uses), then the status of c2 is limited to be
free or owned by p1.
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PCPSystemInv
:
:
stateScheduler = idle
∀ p1, p2 : P ; c1, c2 : CS | (c1, p1) ∈ ownedBy ∧
(p1, c2) ∈ uses ∧ (p2, c2) ∈ uses •
ran ({c2}  ownedBy) = {} ∨ ran ({c2}  ownedBy) = {p1}
The invariant PCPSystemInv is strong enough to prove the fundamental
properties of the system under the priority ceiling protocol, e.g.: A process p1
owning a critical section c1 will not be blocked under the PCP (correspond-
ing to Lemma 9 in [10]). This property can be derived immediately from
PCPSystemInv , because those processes (like p2) which are potentially able
to block p1 (expressed by relation uses) are not allowed to own any conﬂicting
critical section (as c2 would be). So, protocol veriﬁcation on one hand has to
derive the decisive properties which ﬁnally show the validity of timing prop-
erties. On the other hand the validity of the invariant PCPSystemInv has to
established by the application of the formal description of the protocol. In
detail this has to be veriﬁed in by the following steps:
(i) Initially the scheduler is in the state idle and PCPSystemInv is satisﬁed.
(ii) Any sequence of transitions leading from the idle state of the scheduler
back to the idle state preserve the PCPSystemInv .
(iii) Any possible sequence of transitions is ﬁnite and triggered when the
scheduler in state idle.
In contrast to the original approach the new one proves the protocols in their
own terms.
3 The derivation of test suites
Let us imagine the possible beneﬁts of a tool to assess the implemented pro-
tocols against priority inversion with respect to their real-time features. An
ideal outcome of a test tool would be to give the application programmer the
assertion that the invariant PCPSystemInv corresponding to the PCP holds
for the real-time operating system under test (further designated as implemen-
tation under test IUT) or that some other, probably weaker assertion holds.
But this imagination is still far from being realized in an eﬀective and ﬂexible
tool set.
On the other hand there is so much literature available on conformance
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testing and on the automatic generation of test suites. However, almost en-
tirely in the focus of this literature are communication protocols which pri-
marily lead to the derivation of test suites for two communicating sequential
systems. Only a few scientiﬁc work has been done for conformance testing
(e.g. [14] and [1]) and speciﬁcation based testing (e.g. [13] and [12]) in the
scope of real-time systems.
In contrast to these approaches the information which can be derived from
the IUT is very tight. Status information about the execution of the protocol
has to be provided by the actually running process which is executed in the
context of a certain set of processes contending for a certain set of critical
sections. In this context a test suite is a set of particular execution sequences
which is run as test cases on the IUT.
A tool set based on test suites is as powerful as the assumption holds that
a test suite represents the behavior of an equivalence class of computations.
However, it may be that a piece of software is error prone to a certain input
value n and works well for values < n and for values > n. Errors of this kind
cannot be caught by the way test suites are used here. Instead we look for
the lowest value n where some representative course of execution is possible,
e.g. to demonstrate the indirect inheritance of priority it suﬃces to consider
3 processes. By the observation that a test suite worked according to the
speciﬁcation for 3 processes some kind of conﬁdence is given that the system
under test also works well for any higher number > n. Hence, the proposed
test suites only guarantee for correct implementations under the hypothesis
that correctness is independent of running parameters.
XML+DTD
setup
information
XML+DTD
class
diagrams
XML+DTD
statecharts
LaTex-based
Z-
specification
execution space
generator
Jaza
Z-Interpreter
XML+DTD
complete
exec. space
Fig. 5. The architecture of the execution space generator
As a preliminary step to the generation of test suites the execution space
of the parallel processes has to be determined and analyzed. In this context
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the execution space consists of a set of ﬁnite execution sequences of processes
contending for critical sections. Two major components are used for this step:
a syntax directed execution space generator and for the semantics an inter-
preter for Z-speciﬁcations. For the latter a Jaza-interpreter (see [15]) operates
on the Z-schemata for a designated protocol version. The execution space
generator constitutes a front end animating the Jaza-interpreter interactively
or in batch mode. Setup information describes the test scenario consisting
of the processes and their priorities, the critical sections and the protocol-
speciﬁc information on class diagrams, statecharts and Z-schemata (see ﬁgure
5). E.g. for the event sigEnterCS which triggers transition TRProcessT10 a
sequence of corresponding Z-schemata is evaluated directed by the respective
statecharts (track the transitions in ﬁgure 3 and 4):
(mayEnterCS ∧ TRProcessT10)
(TRSchedulerT12)
(wantsCS )
(TRSchedulerT13)(¬ceilingOK ∧ TRSchedulerT15)(TRSchedulerT16)
(next)
(TRSchedulerT4)(hasPendingCS ∧ TRSchedulerT5)
(delayedEnterCS )
(TRSchedulerT7)(TRSchedulerT8)
(TRProcessT7)
Thereby a sequence of intermediate states has to be generated ending in
method sigRun corresponding to transition TRProcessT7. For the derivation
of test suites only the starting state and the ﬁnal state are relevant to document
which process wanted to enter a critical section and that possibly some other
process has been chosen for execution due to the rules of the protocol.
From the viewpoint of validating a certain IUT only the running process
is able to reﬂect the status of the system. Such states where the scheduler is
idle and a certain process is running are named observable states. They are
of major importance, because here
• the invariant PCPSystemInv which is an assertion for the set of processes
has to be satisﬁed and
• the running process can output its identity and its actual priority
So, the sequence of protocol states can be compressed to the observable states
which are really relevant for the subsequent steps of validation.
Besides the compression to the observable states a further reduction of
the execution space can be applied. No true contention for critical sections is
produced when a process gets ready in the presence of ready processes which
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are all of higher priority. However, this reduction cannot prevent that the
execution space grows dramatically, for example shrinks by this rule from n!
to
∑n−1
i=1
(n − i)! diﬀerent sequences for processes to become ready (where
n is the number of processes). For any sequence which is left any process
has
∑m
j=0
(
m
j
)
j ! possibilities to order the acquisition of m critical sections.
These simple calculations reveal that the execution space can be generated
for low numbers of processes and critical sections only, even in the presence of
compression and reduction. Additional policies are needed for the deﬁnition
of observation focuses. Such a focus may start from a certain state reachable
from the start and evolving thenceforth. To achieve this eﬀect feedback with
the execution space generator is needed. As ﬁnal outcome the test suite is
derived which is the set of all viable paths (explained in the next section) in
this reduced execution space (see ﬁgure 6).
XML
complete
exec. space
compression
XML
observable
exec. space
XML
observable
subspace
reduction reductionpolicies
  es-DTD
execution space
generator
viable paths
generator
XML+DTD
set of
viable paths
Fig. 6. The derivation of test suites
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4 The validation process
The validation process is sequential, in testing one viable path of the test
suite after the other. A viable path in this context consists of an execution
sequence for each process augmented by the intent to interleave these processes
in a certain way. So any process gets a particular basic priority and a ready
time. Here e.g. the execution sequence for process P2 with priority 12 and a
relative ready time 4 eventually requesting critical section b 3 :
:
<process name = "p2" priority="12">
<ready time="4"/>
<execute time="1"/>
<enter name="b"/>
<execute time="1"/>
<leave name="b"/>
<execute time="1"/>
<end/>
</process>
:
All these operations of the execution sequence above are time triggered
and scheduled to last one unit of time. Based on this assumption a viable
path executed under a given protocol results in a unique interleaved execution
sequence of all processes, henceforth called a test case. Both, viable path and
test case are denoted in XML for purposes of interchangeability. To illustrate
the nature of the test case it follows an excerpt beginning with the start of
process P2 at time 4
4 :
:
<exp time="4" process="2" priority="12"> <execute time="1"/> </exp>
<exp time="5" process="2" priority="12"> <enter name="b"/> </exp>
<exp time="6" process="1" priority="12"> <execute time="1"/> </exp>
<exp time="7" process="3" priority="14"> <execute time="1"/> </exp>
<exp time="8" process="3" priority="14"> <enter name="b"/> </exp>
:
Notice that at time 6 process P1 inherits priority 12. A respective graph-
ical representation is more condensed and intuitive (see ﬁgure 7 5 ). To go a
little bit deeper into the PCP, let us assume that P1 is speciﬁed as a process
operating on critical sections a and b. In the particular execution sequence
3 The interchange format es-DTD describes the execution space for a certain set of processes
and critical sections (see ﬁgure 6).
4 The interchange format tc-DTD describes the the test cases consisting of viable paths (see
ﬁgure 7).
5 These diagrams are generated automatically. They indicate the actual priority of the run-
ning process. These priorities depend on inheritance, due to the blocking relations between
processes. Blocking is introduced by the unsuccessful acquisition of critical sections. To
make this evident the operations enter and leave are depicted by ascending and descend-
ing rectangles with the name of the critical section inside. An open, ascending rectangle
indicates that the acquisition a critical section was not successful and led to a blocking state
for the attempting process.
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under test here P1 does not enter b. However, conform to the PCP process
P2 has to be blocked when trying to enter critical section b. Later it can be
seen that an existing implementation of the PCP produces a diﬀerent test case
thereby disclosing its non-conformity.
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P3:
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Fig. 7. The execution of the test case as speciﬁed by the PCP
Now time is ripe to focus on the IUT. Typically the operating system
or run-time executive do not dispose of the standard operations enter and
leave as called from the test case. An emulation of these protocol operations
in terms of the IUT has to be coded manually. The critical sections as well
as the processes have to be created. E.g. for Solaris a critical section to be
requested under the PCP has to be created by attributing its ceiling value by
the system call
pthread_mutexattr_setprioceiling()
and after initialization can be used by ptread mutex lock and ptread mutex
unlock in place of enter and leave.
Furthermore all operations like enter, leave and execute have to be
executed on the IUT in a time triggered fashion lasting one unit of time.
The duration of this time unit has to be tuned at least to a value that the
running process is able to reﬂect the actual state of the IUT. Here the decisive
information consists of the process identity and its inherited priority. These
activities are called instrumentation (see ﬁgure 8).
Sometimes a IUT does not provide system calls for the direct output of
the actual (inherited) priority. For this case a further instrumentation with
indicator processes is necessary prolonging the validation process.
Based on the viable path descriptions the processes are executed by the
IUT and produce the same XML output format for their real behavior as for
the conform behavior generated by he Jaza-interpreter. This makes it easy to
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Fig. 8. The validation process
check for violations. Applied to the operating system Solaris which pretends
to implement the PCP (as well as the PIP) the evaluation shows deviations.
It can be seen (ﬁgures 7 and 9) that process P2 is blocked by Solaris at a
very early instant of time. The restriction to the interleaving of processes due
to that protocol is stronger than requested by the PCPSystemInv-invariant.
This observation leads to the supposition that Solaris implements the so called
highest locker protocol. This protocol belongs to the PCP-family which is a
simpliﬁcation of the original PCP in limiting the degree of interleaving. The
timeliness calculations of this version have to take into account that processes
with a medium priority are delayed unnecessarily.
5 Conclusion
This paper describes a complex tool set for conformance testing applied to the
PCP. Particularly the components for compression and reduction as well as
for the evaluation have a prototypical character so far. Nevertheless several
striking results are already available. The one above with Solaris as IUT is
more or less representative for the general strategy to use the PCP as an
attractive label and to implement some weaker protocol, here the highest
locker protocol. The pitfall is that in general application programmers are
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Fig. 9. The real test case produced by Solaris as IUT
not aware of this fact and its implications on timeliness calculations.
Even more striking are the results with respect to the PIP. On one hand
none of the operating systems tested so far is conforming to the PIP-variant
which satisﬁes all theorems associated with the PIP (corresponding to the
original article [10]). On the other hand undetected ﬂaws of the original
protocol have been disclosed when designing the formal description for the
PIP [19]. In this sense our tool set may be considered as one step to more
trusted implementations in an application area where conﬁdence is required.
Due to the semi-automated validation process the experience is that an entire
setup, instrumentation, test suite generation and evaluation can be completed
in up to two days for a given operating system or run-time executive. This
indicates: validation is not necessarily expensive.
As explained in this article the tool set has a sophisticated structure and a
notable degree of automation. Several intermediate ﬁles are necessary. How-
ever, only two DTD-deﬁned data formats (denoted es-DTD and tc-DTD) are
used. This underlines the open source philosophy behind and should be under-
stood as an animation for other scientists to supply improved components and
to instrument this tool set for other purposes than the validation of protocols
against priority inversion.
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